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TCS-2659-58

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28 January 1958

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Project Director**SUBJECT** : Relation of Guided Missile Launch Sites  
to Highest Priority Targets**REFERENCE** : 

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1. The Ad Hoc Requirements Committee has given special attention to the matter of launch sites as a critical aspect of the priority objective, guided missiles, used in the selection of highest priority targets as set forth in the referenced paper. This was motivated in part by SMIE 11-10-57 (The Soviet ICBM Program) which indicates that by early 1956 the Soviets could have made basic decisions bearing on the layout of operational bases and a program of site construction and equipment for either mobile or fixed launching facilities. It is estimated that site construction for operational ICBMs is now in progress.

2. It is a strong probability, we fear, that if fixed operational sites are not detected during construction detection thereafter may be extremely difficult or impossible. An IAC Subcommittee has pointed out to the IAC that aerial photography is by far the most promising as a means of collection of information on the deployment of operational launching sites.

3. In trying to figure out where to look for guided missile launch sites, the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee considered studies prepared by the Army on ICBM launch sites, by the Navy on the areas most likely to reveal information bearing on launch from submarines or surface vehicles, and by ORR/CIA for rail supported ICBM launching facilities. (It is recalled that the engineering analysis group studying KAPUSTIN YAR and TYURA TAM concluded that "The entire facility complex indicates that the Soviet surface-to-surface missile program is directed almost exclusively to the development of mobile systems. Even their largest missiles appear to have been developed for rail mobility.")

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4. As a result of its exploration of the problem of launch sites, the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee advises as follows:

a. Areas for exploration of possible guided missile launch installations (naval, fixed, and mobile) lie for the most part within the thirteen weather areas as indicated on the map TCS-2633-58 with this exception: the rail lines of possible use for mobile launch extending from KOTLAS to VORKUTA and KENOSHA to MOLOTOVSK. This rail line, proximate to MOLOTOVSK but lying outside weather Area 6, may possibly be covered simultaneously with coverage of MOLOTOVSK. However, the suspicion attached to this rail line is such as to warrant it be elevated to a highest priority target.

b. Area 3, as outlined in the referenced map (already a critical target by virtue of nuclear energy installations), now takes on a significance because of rail lines highly suspect as of possible use for mobile ICBM launch which pushes it to the very top of the highest priority targets.

c. Area 7 of the referenced map also contains rail lines of possible use for mobile ICBM launch. It ranks lower than Area 3 or KOTLAS--VORKUTA rail line.

d. Of lesser importance for guided missile launch purposes are:

1) Area 1, which contains rail lines suspect for mobile ICBM launch, and

2) Areas 11 and 12 for naval guided missile launch and possible ICBM launch (analysis of Area 11 was set forth in the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee paper of 7 January 1958

e. Attention is called to the possibility that the Russians might well devise mobile launch sites on short rail spurs attenuated to the OB and YENISEI Rivers supplied with guided missile materiel by river transport from mid-Siberian industrial centers such as KRAENNOYARSK. The Ad Hoc Requirements Committee, lacking sufficient evidence pointing to a reality in this regard, does not

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pose these river areas as highest priority targets. However, should any coverage of these rivers become feasible, either with regard to route planning in covering current highest priority targets or through greater latitude of operations, such exploration might well be conducted. Such coverage might become urgent if analysis of photography from Areas 3 and 7 and the KOTLAS--VORKUTA line were negative with regard to indications of mobile or fixed launch.

5. The studies prepared by the Army, Navy, and ORR are being made available to the Project Intelligence Officer for use in mission planning for the approaches to the highest priority targets already recommended in order to maximize coverage of launch sites, both fixed and mobile.

**JAMES Q. REBER**  
**Chairman**  
**Ad Hoc Requirements Committee**

**JQR:cw**

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